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couple flying to a foreign destination
late in the year to get a divorce and
to spend the holidays vacationing.
They would return home after the
first of the year and remarry, paying
for the trip with their tax savings.
This growing practice and the con
sequent bad publicity proved to be
intolerable to the Internal Revenue
Service. In 1976, the IRS indicated in
Revenue Ruling 76-255 [1976-2 C.B.
40] that such tax avoidance efforts
would not be recognized. The IRS
characterized these tactics as sham
transactions and argued that a
divorce “should not be given any
effect for Federal income tax pur
poses if it merely serves the purpose
of tax avoidance.”
Recently, the validity of this ruling
was contested by a Maryland couple
who were assessed back taxes when
the IRS refused to recognize their
divorce-and-remarriage approach to
tax planning [Boyter, 74 T.C. 989].
David and Angela Boyter were
among the many married taxpayers
to find themselves penalized
because of their marital status. In
response to this situation, they ob
tained a divorce in Haiti in Decem
using the tax provisions as they ber 1975, remarried in Maryland in
would apply for 1984, a single in January 1976, and filed as unmar
dividual with $30,000 of taxable in ried taxpayers for 1975. Substan
come would incur a tax of $6,113. tially the same process was repeated
Thus, an unmarried couple would one year later, with the divorce this
have a tax liability of $12,226 if each time obtained in the Dominican
had $30,000 of taxable income. As a Republic. Again for 1976 the tax
married couple with the same total payers filed as unmarried in
income, their income tax would dividuals.
amount to $14,028 and they would
The IRS offered multiple argu
still suffer a marriage penalty of ments in court as to why the Boyters
$1,802. Even after the recent amend should be treated as married in
ments to the tax law, then, this cou dividuals for tax purposes. The first
ple would be subject to a 14.7 per argument, that Maryland would not
cent tax increase because of the recognize these divorces as valid
decision to get married.
because the foreign courts did not
have jurisdiction, was found to be
Present Situation
persuasive. Since this argument was
Of Controversy
dispositive of the issue, the Tax
The presence of the marriage Court did not respond to the other
penalty gained notoriety about six arguments. This is unfortunate as
years ago when the news media the IRS maintained as another argu
published stories concerning mar ment that the divorces should be ig
ried couples who were divorcing nored “because a year-end divorce
near the end of the year so they whereby the parties intend to and do
could file tax returns as unmarried in fact remarry early in the next year
individuals, and who would then is a sham transaction ..The result
remarry early in the following year. of the Boyter case, then, was to nar
Such a strategy was designed to row the potential path for tax savings
take advantage of the tax rule that through divorce-and-remarriage, but
marital status is determined at the to leave the underlying dispute as to
end of the taxable year [Sec. 143 (a) the validity of Rev. Rul. 76-255 unset
(1)]. A typical case would involve a tled. At least one article has sug-

The Tax Penalty On
Marriage
An Odious Wedding Gift

By John M. Strefeler

The tax penalty on marriage, or
“sin subsidy’’ as it has sometimes
been labeled, is a quirk in the federal
tax system that appeared inadvert
ently as Congress went about its
business of amending the Internal
Revenue Code. The essence of the
problem is that circumstances exist
in which a married couple must pay
more tax than an identical but un
married couple would pay on the
same quantity of taxable income.
Consider a working couple who
each had a 1980 taxable income of
$30,000. If they were single in
dividuals, they would each have had
a 1980 tax liability of $7,962, and
their combined federal income tax
would have been $15,924. If they had
been married, however, their tax ex
penses would have increased to
$19,678. Some quick arithmetic
would show that their wedding pres
ent from Uncle Sam would have
been a healthy 23.6 percent increase
in their tax liability.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 has provided for a partial
correction of the marriage tax prob
lem, in the form of a special tax
deduction which is available to mar
ried couples who both work. Recon
sidering the previous example but
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What caused the tax law's
unintended consequences for
marriage partners?

gested that the sham transaction
doctrine may be ill-suited for ap
plicability to year-end divorces
[Michigan Law Review (Editorial
Board), 1979].
Meanwhile, the IRS has given its
approval to another couple who ex
tended this approach an additional
step [Ltr. Rul. 7835076 No. 2956(78)
P-H Private Letter Rulings]. This
couple was married in 1976 and,
although still compatible, they plan
ned to obtain a valid divorce in their
state of residence. The only change
would be a legal one, since they
would continue to live together and
to carry on their life just as they had
before. The sole reason for their
divorce was the potential tax sav
ings, but the IRS nevertheless ac
cepted the tax implications of their
intended course of action. Since the
divorce would remain in effect for all
legal purposes, it could not be con
strued as a sham and the IRS found
no basis upon which to deny unmar
ried status to the couple.
Such legal maneuvering seems in
credible in the absence of any Con
gressional intent to influence per
sonal decisions regarding marriage.
How, then, can one account for this
unintended consequence of the
federal income tax? The answer
seems to lie in two historical
developments — one involving the
tax system itself and the other con
cerning the increasing number of
two income families in the American
economy.

History Leading To The
Current Situation
Until 1948, marital status was rela
tively unimportant because everyone
used the same set of tax rates. The
assumptions on which the tax
system was based (that the in
dividual should be the basic taxpay
6/The Woman CPA, October, 1982

ing entity and that differing family
situations could be amply provided
for through the use of exemptions)
had seemed to work well. One
reason for this success may have
been that prior to World War II the
exemption was viewed as a vehicle
to exclude from taxation enough in
come to provide adequate support
for a family. The resulting high dollar
amount of exemptions meant that
only a small percentage of the
population was affected by the in
come tax.
After World War II, a major in
equity in what had grown into an all
pervasive income tax became evi
dent. The single tax rate system pro
vided an unintended tax advantage
to taxpayers who resided in com
munity property states.1
In common law states, income is
attributed to the individual who per
forms the services or who owns the
property which is responsible for the
income generation. The typical
situation in the 1940’s was for the
husband to be the breadwinner of
the family and for the wife to be the
homemaker. Thus, whether the mar
ried couple filed a joint return or sep
arate returns, all of the income
would go on one return and be sub
ject to the full brunt of the
progressive tax rates.
In contrast, income in community
property states is earned equally by
marriage partners regardless of
which spouse actually performed the
services. Income generated by com
munity property would also be allo
cated equally to husband and wife.
The result was that married couples
in community property states could
save taxes by filing separate returns,
with each reporting one-half of the
total income. They would have the
advantage of moving through the
lower tax brackets twice — once on
each return.
This lesson was not lost on the
American taxpayer. Residents of
common law states turned to their
state legislatures and soon a num
ber of common law states
(Oklahoma and Michigan, for exam
ple) were in the process of changing
their property rights laws. This unin
1Most states were common law states; that
is, they derived their legal code from English
common law. Eight states (Arizona, Califor
nia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington) based their property
rights instead on community property rules.

tended effect of the tax system led
Congress to enact a provision in the
Revenue Act of 1948 which allowed
married taxpayers filing joint returns
to split their income, thus giving the
advantage of income splitting to all
taxpayers regardless of their state of
residence.
The other change in the tax law
which filled in the missing piece to
create the marriage penalty began
to unfold in 1969. Unmarried tax
payers appealed to Congress con
cerning the differential in tax rates
which existed between single and
married taxpayers. At that time, a
single person could pay up to 41 per
cent more tax than a married couple
with the same total income. Con
gress responded by lowering the
rates for single taxpayers effective in
1971; the new rates limited the ex
cess that a single individual would
pay to 20 percent above the tax of a
married couple. Furthermore, to pre
vent married persons from frustrat
ing the intent of the law by electing
to file separately and use the new
rates for singles, Congress limited
the new Schedule X to single tax
payers. Married persons were re
quired to continue to use Schedule
Y, with separate rate structures for
joint returns and separate returns.
Thus, the single and married-filingseparately rate structures were no
longer combined and the marriage
penalty appeared.

Emergence Of The
Two-Income Family2
While the tax system was evolving
so that the potential of a marriage
tax was present, changes in Ameri
can society made the marriage tax
more widespread in its application.
The primary change has been the in
creasing number and percentage of
wives in the labor force. In 1950, 8.5
million wives were in the labor force,
representing a labor force participa
tion rate3 of 23.8 percent [Schiffman,
1960]. By contrast, the number of
working wives in 1979 totaled 23.8
million for a participation rate of 49.4
percent [Johnson, 1980].
2The author acknowledges the detailed
work of Alan Hee, University of Hawaii gradu
ate assistant, in researching and helping to
write this section.
3Labor force participation rate = number of
married women (husband present in the
household) in the labor force divided by the
civilian pop
ulation of married women (husband
present).

TABLE 1

Marriage Bonus (+ ) And Marriage Penalty (- )
Under ERTA (1980) Tax Provisions
WIFE’S ADJUSTED
GROSS INCOME
50,000

+ 3,344

+ 1,144

-

379

- 1,691

- 2,699

- 3,474

- 4,014

- 4,314

- 4,369

- 4,394

- 4,394

45,000

+ 3,126

+ 1,094

-

429

- 1,711

- 2,699

- 3,474

- 4,014

- 4,314

- 4,369

- 4,394

- 4,394

40,000

+ 2,801

+

901

-

454

- 1,736

- 2,694

- 3,449

- 3,989

- 4,289

- 4,344

- 4,369

- 4,369

35,000

+ 2,374

+

606

-

617

- 1,731

- 2,689

- 3,414

- 3,934

- 4,234

- 4,289

- 4,314

- 4,314

30,000

+ 1,929

+

424

-

667

- 1,649

- 2,439

- 3,164

- 3,654

- 3,934

- 3,989

- 4,014

- 4,014

25,000

+ 1,505

+

219

-

609

- 1,459

- 2,117

- 2,674

- 3,164

- 3,414

- 3,449

- 3,474

- 3,474

20,000

+ 1,092

+

30

-

579

- 1,166

- 1,692

- 2,117

- 2,439

- 2,689

- 2,694

- 2,699

- 2,699

15,000

+

710

-

150

-

535

-

903

- 1,166

- 1,459

- 1,649

- 1,731

- 1,736

- 1,711

- 1,691

10,000

+

475

-

208

-

391

-

535

-

579

-

609

-

667

-

617

-

454

-

-

5,000

+

250

-

202

-

208

-

150

+

30

+

219

+

424

+

606

+

901

+ 1,094

+ 1,144

0

+

0

+

250

+

475

+

710

+ 1,092

+ 1,505

+ 1,929

+ 2,374

+ 2,801

+ 3,126

+ 3,344

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

0

5,000

10,000

429

379

HUSBAND’S ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME

Table assumes no dependents and that deductions are not itemized

The increase in two-earner
families is partially due to the failure
of real income to maintain the
growth rate which had occurred in
the early post-war period. Between
1947 and 1962, the annual real wage
gain averaged about 2.5 percent,
almost three times the annual in
crease in the years since 1962. The
erosion is attributable to the decline
in productivity rates among Ameri
can workers and to the sharp in
crease in inflation over this period
[Douty, 1977]. The continuation of
these trends seem certain to make
the two-income family an in
creasingly common fixture in Ameri
can society.
Another factor which influences
the labor participation rate among
wives is the presence of children.
Wives are more likely to work if there
are no school-age or pre-school
children in the household. Following
World War II, many married women
were involved in caring for children
during this period of high birth rates.

Beginning in the late 1960’s,
however, the number of working
wives accelerated. This trend con
tinued during the 1970’s as declining
birth rates resulted in fewer children
to raise. Thus, the changing
character of the family household
explains much of the increase in
working wives [Slater, 1979].

Dimension Of The Marriage
Penalty Prior To ERTA
All married couples have not
suffered the burden of the marriage
tax. When all or the vast proportion
of income was generated by one of
the parties, there was no penalty and
in fact there was a tax savings. This
is seen for 1980 as the positive zone
of Table 1. A tax savings of $2,801
existed, for example, if a married
couple had $40,000 of taxable in
come which was generated entirely
by one spouse.
On the other hand, Table 1 also

reveals that the marriage penalty
was not limited to a narrow income
range and that the amount of tax
differential could be substantial. The
two-career family would fall into the
penalty area in almost every in
stance. If the previous example were
altered by assuming that the income
was equally divided between the
spouses, the tax savings would be
replaced by a $1,692 penalty.
Table 2 provides additional detail
about the situation in which both in
comes were equal, which was where
the marriage penalty was most ex
treme. In particular, it emphasizes
how broad and deep the marriage
tax had become. The penalty is
already evident at the $4,000 level of
taxable income. Two single persons
splitting this income would have had
no tax liability, while a married cou
ple would have owed $84 of income
taxes. At a taxable income of $84,000
the marriage tax reached its max
imum for wages and other forms of
personal service income; a married
The Woman CPA, October, 1982/7

TABLE 2

Marriage Penalty
Under Pre-ERTA (1980) Tax Provisions
For Couples With Equal Incomes

Total
Taxable
Income

$100,000
92,000
84,000
76,000
68,000
60,000
52,000
44,000
36,000
28,000
20,000
12,000
4,000

Marriage
Penalty

$4,394
4,394
4,394
4,324
4,234
3,754
3,074
2,232
1,496
903
451
221
84

couple would have paid $4,394 of
additional taxes.4

Causes Of The
Marriage Penalty
The primary cause of the marriage
tax has been the differentiating
among taxpayers by means of the
tax rate structure; married couples
have been denied use of the same
tax rates as were available to unmar
ried taxpayers. They must instead
use either the married-filing-sepa 
rately schedule in which the
progressive rates rise more rapidly,
or use the married-filing jointly
schedule which has brackets twice
4Prior to 1981, the maximum tax rules gave
a preference to personal service income. Per
sonal service income was subject to a max
imum marginal rate of 50 percent. Other in
come could be taxed at rates as high as 70
percent, which would have caused the mar
riage penalty to be even greater. For a mar
ried couple with $100,000 of income which
was not personal service income, for exam
ple, the marriage penalty would have been
$5,864 if the income were earned equally. The
pre-1981 examples in this article assume per
sonal service income as a matter of
simplicity. The Economic Recovery Act of
1981 lowered the top tax bracket to 50 per
cent for all income, thus ending the tax dis
tinction between personal service income
and passive income.

8/The Woman CPA, October, 1982

Married Tax
As a percent
of
Unmarried Tax
112
114
116
119
122
124
124
123
121

119
116
118
—

as wide but which taxes the income
as one bundle and thus stacks the
income of one spouse on top of the
income of the other.
A contributing factor has been the
standard deduction. A single in
dividual may take a standard deduc
tion (now called the zero bracket
amount) of $2,300; two unmarried in
dividuals would receive twice this
amount, or $4,600, on their two
returns. Were they married, they
could take a combined standard
deduction of only $3,400. Thus,
being married could deprive a cou
ple of $1,200 of deductions to which
they would otherwise be entitled.
This factor is unimportant to tax
payers who itemize deductions, but
well over half of all taxpayers do not
itemize.

Effects Of The
Marriage Penalty
While there is no indication that
Congress intended to influence
marital decisions through tax provi
sions, several consequences derive
from the lack of tax neutrality with
respect to marital status.
One consequence of a marriage
penalty is that it provides a disincen
tive to marry and an incentive for

married persons to divorce. How
many of the small but growing num
ber of couples who are unmarried
and living together considered the
marriage tax as one of their decision
factors is unknown, but the financial
implications can be substantial. It is
also evident that those taxpayers
who do forsake marriage for tax
reasons have been very visible.
Another effect of a marriage
penalty is that it operates as a work
disincentive for married women rela
tive to those who are single. The
married woman finds that her in
come is added to that of her husband
and, while the tax brackets that she
faces are twice as wide as those of
her single counterpart, she does not
receive the advantage of going
through the lower brackets. Other
things being equal, her after-tax
earnings are lower than those of a
single woman.
As an example, suppose two
women were offered jobs with 1980
salaries of $20,000. Circumstances
were identical except that one
woman was married to a man who
earned a taxable income of $20,000
per year, while the other was unmar
ried and claimed the standard
deduction. For the unmarried woman
there would have been a $3,415 tax
levied, while the tax on the income of
her married counterpart would have
been $7,001. The tax for the married
woman thus would have been over
twice the tax for the single women.
A third consequence is the risk
that tax situations such as a mar
riage penalty may undermine the
perceived equity of the tax system
and reduce the level of voluntary
compliance. For those taxpayers
who cannot or who choose not to
use the marriage tax to their advan
tage, the knowledge that others take
advantage of the tax system in this
contrived manner may cause them to
regard the system as unfair. It is easy
to envision such taxpayers cutting
corners in other ways — unreported
income and overstated deductions,
for example — to even things out.

Treatment Of The Marriage
Penalty— ERTA Changes
The approach to the problem of
the marriage tax which was imple
mented by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 is the provision of a
deduction based upon the qualified
earned income5 of the secondary

wage earner, such person being
defined as the spouse who has the
lesser amount of earnings in a par
ticular year. This new deduction,
allowed by new Sec. 221 of the Code,
will be an adjustment to gross in
come and thus available even for
taxpayers who do not itemize their
deductions. The deduction will equal
five percent of the qualified earned
income of the secondary wage
earner in 1982, with a $30,000 limit
on eligible qualified earned income.
For years after 1982, the deduction
will increase from five to ten percent
of qualified earned income. The
$30,000 ceiling will remain in effect,
so that the maximum deduction will
be $1,500 in 1982 and $3,000 for all
subsequent years.
Using a deduction as the vehicle
for alleviating the tax on the earn
ings of the secondary wage earner is
relatively simple and directly ad
dresses the problem of the tax treat
ment of secondary family income.
Table 3 shows the status of the mar
riage penalty for 1984, the first year
that the full tax deductions under
ERTA will be in effect; a comparison
with Table 1 indicates the changes
which will result. Obviously a deduc
tion of this sort will reduce but not
eliminate the tax penalty on mar
riage. For example, the penalty on a
married couple who each have ad
justed gross incomes of $30,000
would be reduced from $3,654 to
$1,722 or by a total of $1,932.
A possible criticism of the deduc
tion method is that it is not an even
reduction for all two-earner couples.
Since a deduction is beneficial in
accordance with the marginal tax
rates of taxpayers, the secondary in
come deduction is of more value to
married couples with higher in
comes. While the married couple
splitting $60,000 of income in the
previous example was able to save
$1,932, a couple evenly dividing
$40,000 of adjusted gross income
would gain only $1,044 in tax relief.
In response to this criticism,
however, it should be noted that the
marriage penalty itself is most se5Qualified earned income is technically
defined in ERTA. For example, it does not in
clude retirement plan distributions, deferred
compensation, or certain wages when one
spouse is employed by the other. Also, com
munity property laws are ignored so that
earned income is attributed to the spouse
who actually performs the services to earn
the income.

vere for high-income families. Apply
ing a judgment criterion of vertical
equity does not seem appropriate, as
the purpose of the provision is to
seek equity in a different form —
namely between two-earner married
couples and two-earner unmarried
couples. It may thus be argued that
tax relief should be unequal since
the underlying problem penalizes
families unequally.
A further criticism of a deduction
is that it does not resolve the un
derlying issue of marriage neutrality.
Both the marriage penalty and the
marriage bonus continue to exist.
Again looking at Tables 1 and 3, one
can see that there has been no ap
preciable change in the scope of the
marriage tax. The size of the mar
riage penalty has shrunk, but the
penalty continues to occur in all of
the squares where it had occurred
prior to ERTA. A deduction,
therefore, does not involve a
theoretically consistent tax policy
regarding the treatment of marital
status. Sometimes couples are
rewarded for being married; at other
times they are penalized.
In defense of the deduction ap
proach to alleviating the tax penalty
on marriage, however, there is no
simple proposal which would not
suffer from significant drawbacks.
An alternative which has a great
deal of surface appeal, for example,
is to allow married couples to file
separate tax returns and use the tax
rate schedule (and other tax rules)
for single taxpayers. Such an elec
tive filing technique would directly
attack the objectionable symptom of
the current tax system; married
couples would be relieved of the
marriage penalty by being allowed
to use the tax rules for unmarried
persons.
Unfortunately, this procedure
would resurrect the inequitable
treatment of unmarried persons.
Consider a married couple with a
1984 taxable income of $40,000
divided equally between them. Their
tax, if they each were to file as single
persons, would total $6,410. An un
married individual with $40,000 of
taxable income would incur a tax of
$9,749, an amount 52 percent higher
than the tax of the married couple.
This situation appears unacceptable
when one recalls that in 1969 Con
gress found a 41 percent difference
to be objectionable.

Special deductions do not
resolve the underlying issue of
marriage neutrality.

Also, allowing married couples
the option of filing separately is a
one-sided solution to the issue. The
marriage penalty is erased, but mar
riage neutrality has not been
achieved. The married couple whose
income is derived entirely (or almost
entirely) from one spouse would still
enjoy a marriage bonus.
Another drawback of this proposal
is that it would add complexity to the
tax return preparation process.
Many couples would have to com
pute their taxes both ways to deter
mine whether they would receive
more advantage from income split
ting on a joint return or from using
the same standards as single per
sons. This would involve three com
putations — one for each spouse
separately and one for the couple if
they were to file jointly.
In the final analysis, then, the at
tractiveness of the two-earner
deduction is in its short-run and
practical results rather than in a
long-run theoretical justification. It
reduces the marriage penalty im
mediately and leaves a more con
suming treatment of the issue to the
future. One might regard it as a com
panion to the relief of the single tax
payer which was enacted as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Just as
that legislation dealt with the singles
tax penalty not eliminating it but by
reducing it to bounds which Con
gress considered to be tolerable, so
too the current deduction decreases
the size of the marriage tax to what
proponents might argue to be an
acceptable level.

Conclusion
The essence of the marriage
penalty is that in some situations a
The Woman CPA, October, 1982/9

TABLE 3
Marriage Bonus (+) And Marriage Penalty (- )
Under ERTA (1984) Tax Provisions
WIFE’S ADJUSTED
GROSS INCOME
50,000

+ 2,861

+ 1,344

+ 356

-

528

- 1,274

- 1,844

- 2,226

- 2,630

- 2,830

- 3,062

- 3,212

45,000

+ 2,521

+ 1,144

+

156

-

668

- 1,274

- 1,844

- 2,226

- 2,630

- 2,830

- 2,930

- 3,062

40,000

+ 2,171

+

879

+

56

-

768

- 1,334

- 1,744

- 2,126

- 2,530

- 2,730

- 2,830

- 2,830

35,000

+ 1,727

+

629

-

134

-

768

- 1,334

- 1,724

- 1,946

- 2,330

- 2,530

- 2,630

- 2,630

30,000

+ 1,458

+

448

-

180

-

779

- 1,130

- 1,520

- 1,722

- 1,946

- 2,126

- 2,226

- 2,226

25,000

+ 1,152

+

268

-

198

-

670

-

978

- 1,143

- 1,520

- 1,724

- 1,744

- 1,844

- 1,844

20,000

+

844

+

135

-

205

-

492

-

648

-

978

- 1,130

- 1,334

- 1,334

- 1,274

- 1,274

15,000

+

540

17

-

177

-

338

-

492

-

670

-

779

-

768

-

768

-

668

-

528

10,000

+

376

-

73

-

91

-

177

-

205

-

198

-

180

-

134

-

56

-

156

-

356

5,000

+

193

-

85

-

73

-

85

+

135

+

268

+

448

+

629

+

879

+ 1,144

+ 1,344

0

+

0

+

193

+

376

+

540

+

844

+ 1,152

+ 1,458

+ 1,727

+ 2,171

+ 2,521

+ 2,861

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

HUSBAND’S ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME

Table assumes no dependents and that deductions are not itemized;
AGI figures are before the new two-earner deduction (to be consistent with Table 1)

couple pays more taxes by filing as a
married couple than they would pay
if they were to file as two single in
dividuals. This unintended result of
congressional tax changes has
caused some couples to turn to
divorce-and-remarriage or to
divorce-and-living-together as a
means of tax savings, with the latter
technique being less risky in light of
current IRS policy.
Some of the aspects of the mar
riage tax which have made revision
desirable are the disincentive for
taxpayers to get or to remain mar
ried, the disincentive for married
women to work outside of the home,
and the threat to the fairness of and
respect for the tax system.
To alleviate the problem of the tax
penalty on marriage, Congress
enacted a two-earner deduction as
part of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981. This provision will, when
fully phased in 1983, grant a 10 per
cent deduction on the first $30,000 of
earnings of the secondary wage
earner. While not a comprehensive
cure which eliminates the underly
ing ailment, it is a treatment which
10/The Woman CPA, October, 1982

relieves the most serious symptom
until a more thorough approach to
the issue can be mounted. As one
author has noted somewhat
philosophically, “we cannot ignore
the opportunity to make small but
positive changes while waiting for a
massive tax reform which may never
come.” [Rosen, 1977.]. Ω
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